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Abstract
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players’
information about others’ play arrives with stochastic lags. In our ﬁrst model, signals
are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an
almost-perfect signal of period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t
play. In the second model, the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of
imperfect public monitoring, and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk
messages at the end of each period. In each case, we construct equilibria in “delayed-
response strategies,” which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to signals
that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond. To
do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the
small residual amount of private information.
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Understanding when and why individuals cooperate in social dilemmas is a key issue not
just for economics but for all of the social sciences,1 and the theory of repeated games is
the workhorse model of how and when concern for the future can lead to cooperation even
if all agents care only about their own payoﬀs. The clearest expression of this idea comes
as players become arbitrarily patient; here various folk theorems provide conditions under
which approximately eﬃcient payoﬀs can be supported by equilibrium strategies. Because of
the inﬂuence of these results, it is important to understand which of their assumptions are
critical and which are merely convenient simpliﬁcations; a large literature (discussed below)
has extended the folk theorems under successively weaker assumptions about the “monitoring
structures” that govern the signals players receive about one another’s actions.
Here we relax an assumption which is maintained throughout most of the prior repeated
games literature: the assumption that signals of the actions taken in each period (simul-
taneously) arrive immediately after players’ actions in that period. Instead, we consider
repeated games in which the players’ signals about other player’s actions arrive with stochas-
tic and privately observed lags. Our folk theorems for settings with lagged signals show that
the assumption that signals are observed immediately is not necessary for repeated play to
support cooperation.
To prove these folk theorems, we use the idea of “delayed-response” strategies, under
which players wait to respond to signals of a given period’s play for long enough that it
is likely (although not certain) that every player has observed the relevant signals by the
time players respond to signal information. Although the observation lags generate a form
1See e.g., Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, and Walker (2003); Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni (2004).
1of imperfect private monitoring, the private information here has a special form that allows
delayed-response strategies to construct the same set of limit equilibrium payoﬀs as if the
lags were not present.
More speciﬁcally, we suppose that players act simultaneously each period, and that play-
ers’ actions jointly determine a probability distribution over signals, but that players
 do not observe signals immediately and
 might observe signals asynchronously.
The times at which observation occurs are private information and may be inﬁnite, that
is, a particular signal may never arrive. Such observation lags seem plausible in many cases,
but seem especially appropriate—or possibly even physically necessary—in settings for which
the time period under consideration is extremely short (Fudenberg and Levine (2007a, 2009);
Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2010)), and in continuous-time models, where the “period length” is
eﬀectively 0 (Bergin and MacLeod (1993); Sannikov (2007); Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007);
Faingold and Sannikov (2011)).
To prove our folk theorems, we construct delayed-response strategies, in which the re-
peated game is divided into a ﬁnite number of “threads,” with play in each thread indepen-
dent of play in the other threads. Section 3 examines the simplest application of this idea,
which is to the case of bounded lags, here there is a K such that every signal arrives within
K periods of play. Then, using strategies that have K + 1 threads, we can ensure that each
thread is equivalent to an instance of the original game (with the original game’s underlying
monitoring structure), a smaller discount factor, and no lag. Hence if the folk theorem holds
in a given repeated game (with any sort of contemporaneous monitoring), the associated
2strategies can be used to establish a folk theorem—in delayed-response strategies—in the
corresponding game with bounded observation lags.2
The rest of the paper allows the lag distribution to have unbounded support, and also
allows for a small probability that some signals never arrive at all (corresponding to an inﬁnite
observation lag). In these cases the use of delay strategies reduces but does not eliminate
the impact of lags, and the game played in each thread has some additional decision-relevant
private information. Section 4 considers the case where signals are almost-perfect if and
when they do arrive—that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-
t play with some lag, or else never sees a signal of period-t play.3 In our second model,
presented in Section 5, players are allowed to communicate (via cheap talk) each period, and
the underlying information structure is one of imperfect public monitoring. In each case,
players do not know whether and when other players observe the signals associated with
each period’s play, so there is a special but natural form of private information.
For both of our main results, we use a similar proof technique: First, we consider an
auxiliary game with “rare” lags in which each player sees a private signal immediately with
probability close to (but not equal to) 1. In the auxiliary game, the probability of seeing
a signal immediately is assumed to be independent of the action proﬁle played and of the
signals seen by other players. After proving a folk theorem for the auxiliary game with rare
lags, we relate the perturbed game with rare lags to the game with possibly long lags by
2The Ellison (1994) study of contagion equilibria uses threads for a rather diﬀerent purpose: to substitute
for public randomization as a way to weaken the eﬀect of a grim-trigger punishment as the discount factor
tends to 1. In Sections 3 and 4, we use threads only as a way for the players to wait for lagged signals to
arrive; in Section 5, we also use threading in order to weaken the eﬀect of grim-trigger punishments.
3In the case of lagged almost-perfect monitoring, we consider only games with two players, so that we
may invoke results of Hörner and Olszewski (2006). We do not know whether the folk theorem extends to
the analogous setting with n players.
3identifying the event in which the signal does not arrive immediately with the event that the
signal arrives after some large time T. We then obtain equilibria in the game with lags by
using delayed-response strategies as described above.
1.1 Past Work on Models without Observation Lags
As noted above, a substantial literature has explored successively weaker assumptions on
players’ monitoring structures, while maintaining the assumption that signals arrive imme-
diately after play. The ﬁrst wave of repeated-games models established folk theorems under
the assumption that players observe each others’ actions without error at the end of each
round of play (Aumann and Shapley (1976); Friedman (1971); Rubinstein (1994); Fuden-
berg and Maskin (1986)). Subsequent work extended the folk theorem to cases where agents
receive imperfect signals of other agents’ actions, where these signals can either be public
(Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994)) or private but accompanied by cheap-talk public
messages (Compte (1998); Kandori and Matsushima (1998)),4 or private and without com-
munication (e.g., Sekiguchi (1997); Mailath and Morris (2002); Hörner and Olszewski (2006);
Hörner and Olszewski (2009)). As one step in our argument for the case of lagged almost-
perfect monitoring (Section 4), we extend the Hörner and Olszewski (2006) construction to
almost-perfect monitoring with rare lags.5 With each type of signal structure, the key as-
sumptions relate to the qualitative nature of the information that signals provide: Roughly
4We allow public messages in Section 5. The role of such messages has been studied in a number of
subsequent papers, including Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003); Fudenberg and Levine (2007b); Escobar
and Toikka (2011). Public communication has also been used as a stepping stone to results for games where
communication is not allowed (Hörner and Olszewski (2006); Hörner and Olszewski (2009); Sugaya (2011)).
5When the unlagged signals are imperfect, the signals in our auxiliary games are not almost common
knowledge in the sense of Mailath and Morris (2002), so the Hörner and Olszewski (2009) construction does
not apply.
4speaking, in order for the folk theorem to obtain, signals must be informative enough to
“identify deviations” in a statistical sense.6
1.2 Past Work on Models with Observation Lags
The papers of Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011) and Bhaskar and Obara (2011) are the
closest to the present work, as in each, the time at which signals arrive is private information.
Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011) studied the eﬀect of short privately-known lags in observing
the position of a state variable that evolves in continuous time, so that a players observing
the state variable at slightly diﬀerent times would get diﬀerent readings. Bhaskar and Obara
(2011) studied lags that were either deterministic or stochastic with length at most one.
Both papers considered “short lags” and also restricted to the case of a single long-run player
facing a sequence of short-run opponents; this paper allows fairly general stochastic lags and
considers the case of all long-run players.
Several papers in the stochastic games literature studied deterministic lags of perfect
signals (e.g., Levy (2009); Yao, Xu, and Jiang (2011)); this sort of lag does not introduce
private information and so is quite diﬀerent from the lags we study.7 Abreu, Milgrom, and
Pearce (1990) showed that accumulation of signals over many periods can actually improve
players’ information. In their model, however, consecutive signals’ are simply grouped to-
gether and delivered at once—unlike in our framework, the delay does not introduce private
information.
6In addition, the folk theorem has been extended to recurrent stochastic games with perfectly or imper-
fectly observed actions (Dutta (1995); Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011); Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and
Vieille (2011)).
7Levy (2009) studied undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games with a deterministic observation lag that
increases over time; Yao, Xu, and Jiang (2011) studied trigger strategies in a continuous-time oligopoly
model with deterministic lags of perfectly observed signals.
52 General Model
In this section, we introduce a general model which encompasses all the settings discussed
in later sections. We consider a repeated game with n players i 2 I  f1;:::;ng, each of
whom has a ﬁnite action space Ai. In each period t = 0;1;2;:::, players choose actions at
i;
this generates a sequence of action proﬁles fatg1
t=0. Each player i has a signal space 
i; and




i; at each time t, a private signal proﬁle
is generated by  according to the conditional probability (!1;:::;!njat):
Thus far, the repeated game has the structure of a standard repeated game with private
monitoring. We now relax the assumption that players receive signals of period-t play im-
mediately after period t by replacing it with the assumption that the monitoring structure
is private with stochastic lags. As in the usual model, upon the choice of a period-t action
proﬁle at, a private signal proﬁle !t is generated according to the conditional distribution
(!tjat). However, the players need not immediately observe their components of the signal




i;k , and suppose that player i ob-
serves the component !t
i;k of !t
i; at a stochastic time t+Lt
i;k, where fLt
i;kgi;k;t is a collection of
independently distributed random variables that take values in N[f1g and are (identically)
distributed according to the probability density function  : N [ f1g ! [0;1]. We denote
by  the cumulative distribution function, i.e. (l) =
Pl
m=0 (m).8 (The case Lt
i;k = 1
is interpreted as the event in which player i never receives any information about the k-th
coordinate of the period-t private signal.)
Observation of !t
i;k takes place in period t+Lt
i;k after the choice of that period’s actions.
8The assumption that the collection fLt
i;lgi;l;t is i.i.d. is not necessary for the results and is only assumed
to simplify the exposition. For example: if the lags are independently distributed but not identical, then our
results still hold. We believe that further relaxations of the i.i.d. assumption are also possible.
6When player i observes !t
i;k, he also observes a “timestamp” indicating that !t
i;k is associated
with play in period t.9 Players have perfect recall and receive no further information.
In one part of the paper we allow for communication in every period. Thus, we include
message spaces Mi in the general model; when we want to rule out communication we set Mi
= ; for each i. After the realization of private signal proﬁle !t and after the observation of all
private information !t0
i;k for which t0+Lt0
i;k  t, at each time t = 0;1;:::, each player i reports a
message mi chosen from the message space Mi. After all of these reports are (simultaneously)
submitted, all players immediately observe the message proﬁle m = (m1;:::;mn).
We let Ht denote the set of t-period histories. For a given ht 2 Ht and any t0  t, we
denote by ht;t0 the proﬁle of information about the t0-period signal that has been observed
by each player.
Finally we describe the payoﬀ structure. A sequence of action proﬁles fatg chosen by the













We assume that player i does not observe the ﬂow payoﬀ ri(at
i;!t
i) until i has observed all
coordinates of the period-t private signal !i. If Lt
i;k = 1 for some i, k, and t, then we assume
for convenience that player i never observes the period-t ﬂow payoﬀ ri(at
i;!t
i).10
We let a be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game and develop a series of Nash threat
9Thus player i cannot respond to the period-(t + Lt
i;k) observation information until time t + Lt
i;k + 1.
10We make these assumptions about the observation of payoﬀs so that players cannot infer their private
signals from payoﬀs.
7folk theorems. For ease of exposition, we normalize payoﬀs of players so that gi(a) = 0 for
all i. We let V denote the convex hull of the feasible set of payoﬀs, and let Va be the convex
hull of the set consisting of g(a) = 0 and the payoﬀ vectors Pareto-dominating g(a) = 0:
Va  fv 2 V j v  0g:
We assume that int(Va) is non-empty. Furthermore, we deﬁne V  to be the set of individually
rational payoﬀs of V . With this notation, we are ready to discuss our folk theorems.
We let G(;;) be the repeated game with discount factor , lag distribution , and
monitoring structure , and let E(;;) denote the set of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of
G(;;). We let G(;)  G(;;imm), where imm is the (degenerate) distribution which
puts full weight on immediate observation, and deﬁne E(;)  E(;;imm) similarly.
Finally we introduce the concept of delayed-response strategies, which will be used
throughout the remainder of the paper to prove our folk theorems.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let  be a strategy proﬁle. Then  is a delayed-response strategy proﬁle
if there exists some K such that for all t = 0;1;:::;K, (ht) = (^ ht) for all ht;^ ht 2 Ht
and for all t = `K + t0 where t0 2 f0;:::;Kg and `  1, (ht 1) = (^ ht 1) whenever
ht 1;`0K+t0 = ^ ht 1;`0K+t0 for all `0 = 0;1;:::;`   1.
In words, this means that  is a delayed-response strategy proﬁle if there exists some K
such that players at time t condition their play only on information regarding a signal that
was generated in period t   `K for some ` 2 N.
83 Bounded Lags
We ﬁrst present a simple analysis of a repeated game with observation lags in which the lag
is certain to be no more than some ﬁnite bound.
Assumption 3.1. There exists some K < 1 such that (K) = 1.
With this assumption, it is common knowledge that all players will have seen the sig-
nal generated in period t by period t + K. This restriction allows us to show that every
equilibrium payoﬀ attainable for suﬃciently large discount factors) in the repeated game
without observation lags with monitoring structure  can also be attained in the associated
repeated game with observation lags for suﬃciently patient players. We show this using
delayed-response strategies.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. Furthermore suppose that v 2 E(;) for all
 2 (;1) where 0 <  < 1. Then there exists some 
 2 (0;1) such that v 2 E(;;) for
all  2 (
;1).
Proof. Divide the periods of the repeated game into K + 1 threads, with the `-th thread
consisting of periods `, K + 1 + `, 2K + 2 + `,...
For any equilibrium strategy proﬁle  of the game without lags, construct the associated
delayed-response strategy proﬁle K by specifying that if t = j(K +1)+` where 0  `  K,
players treat history ht as if it were period j of the game without lags. Thus if  is the




The proof of Theorem 3.2 relies heavily on Assumption 3.1. For example, if the support
of  were concentrated on 0;1;:::;K < 1 and 1, then the proof above would not work
9since each of threads that it constructs would be a repeated game with a private monitoring
structure ~  that is diﬀerent from . More problematically, if (k) > 0 for all k 2 N so all lag
lengths have positive probability, then no matter how far apart the threads are spaced, there
is always a positive probability that the realized lag will be longer than this chosen spacing,
and the threads considered in the proof above cannot be identiﬁed with a private monitoring
game at all. In the next two sections, we study and demonstrate how these issues can be
resolved when we place additional assumptions on the monitoring structure . Therefore for
the remainder of the paper, we dispense with Assumption 3.1 and allow  to be any arbitrary
probability distribution on N [ f1g.
4 Lagged Almost-Perfect Monitoring in the Case of Two
Players
In this section, we extend an approach of Hörner and Olszewski (2006) (henceforth, HO2006),
in order to obtain a folk theorem for two-player games with lagged almost-perfect monitoring.
We focus on the two-player case since the techniques of HO2006 extend naturally to this
setting.11
4.1 Model
We restrict the general monitoring structure introduced above. First, we assume that there
are only two players. We assume the monitoring structure to be that of lagged "-perfect
11We do not know whether our folk theorem extends to games with n players; we discuss the issues related
to such extension in Section 6.
10monitoring: We allow a general lag structure here, but restrict the private signal space of
each player i to be 
i = Aj (so ci = 1) and furthermore assume that  is "-perfect in the
sense of HO2006.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A private monitoring structure  is "-perfect if for every action proﬁle
a 2 A,
(a2;a1 j a1;a2) > 1   ":
4.1.1 The Folk Theorem
We now prove the following folk theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that v 2 int(V ). Then there exist some  ";  2 (0;1) such that
v 2 E(;;) for all  >  , all lag distributions  for which (1) <  ", and all private
monitoring structures  that are  "-perfect.12
To prove Theorem 4.2, we ﬁrst analyze an auxiliary repeated game with “rare” observation
lags, in which the probability of instantaneous observation of the private signal is very
close to 1. We show that the HO2006 approach to repeated games with almost-perfect
monitoring can be extended to lagged repeated games with almost-perfect monitoring, so
long as positive lags are suﬃciently rare, and use this to obtain a folk theorem in the
auxiliary game. We then convert the associated auxiliary-game strategies to delayed-response
strategies by multithreading the game with lags. A positive lag in a particular thread
corresponds to a lag that exceeds the number of threads, so by taking the delay long enough
12We thank Yuichi Yamamoto for pointing out a problem with our earlier proof of this result and then
suggesting the approach we use now.
11we can shrink the probability of a positive lag close to 0. We thus obtain a folk theorem in
the game with stochastic lags.
4.2 Auxiliary Repeated Game with Rare Observation Lags
We ﬁrst analyze the case of repeated games with “rare” observation lags, i.e. lagged repeated
games for which (0) is close to one. For such games, we obtain the following folk theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let v 2 int(V ). Then there exist  "; 2 (0;1) such that if (0) > 1  ",  is
 "-perfect, and  >  then v 2 E(;;).
Our proof of this theorem adapts a technique of HO2006 to the environment with small
observation lags, and then implements the resulting strategies in delayed-response equilibria.
Note ﬁrst that because the information lag is not bounded, it is possible that information
about some past event arrives very late in the repeated game. Such possibilities cannot be
ignored—even though they happen with very low probability—since they may potentially
aﬀect a player’s beliefs about his opponent’s continuation play. The technique of HO2006
deals with this problem by constructing equilibria that are belief-free every T periods for the
repeated game with the probability of lagged observation suﬃciently small.13 This means
that only information about the past T periods is relevant for computing best replies. Thus,
we can ensure that eﬀects on beliefs due to observation lags lasting more than T periods are
unimportant.
Note next that lags of length less than T do aﬀect players’ on-path beliefs, so the HO2006
arguments do not directly apply; we extend them by adding the histories where observations
13A strategy is belief-free at time t if the continuation strategy at time t, si j h
t 1
i , is a best response
against s i j h
t 1




 i ). (Here, as we deﬁne formally below, “j” indicates the
restriction of a strategy to a given history set.
12arrive with a positive lag to the set of “erroneous” histories. This allows us to extend the
methods of HO2006 to lagged repeated games for which (0) is suﬃciently close to 1.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
Before we begin this discussion, we review and extend some deﬁnitions and notations of
HO2006.
We let Ht
i be the set of t-period histories in the repeated game with observation lags,
















i denotes all of the new information about the past play of player  i that player i
receives in period t. Furthermore denote by ST
i the set of strategies in the T-times repeated
game with information lags.
Analogously we deﬁne ~ Ht
i to be the set of t-period histories in the repeated game without
observation lags and with perfect monitoring. We denote a typical element of ~ Ht
i by ~ ht
i. Also
let us deﬁne the set of strategies in the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring and
no observation lags by ~ ST
i .
As in the approach of HO2006, we partition the set of private histories in the T-times-
repeated stage game into two sets, HR
i and HE
i , which we respectively call the regular and
erroneous histories.
To deﬁne these sets of histories we ﬁrst deﬁne restricted strategy sets ~ Si and ~ S

i for
i = 1;2 in the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring as in HO2006. We include the
deﬁnitions for completeness, but since these deﬁnitions are identical to those introduced in
13HO2006, we omit any discussion. We partition the set Ai into two subsets, denoted G and
B. We call an instance of the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring a block, and
say that a player i sends message M 2 fG;Bg if he picks an action in M in the ﬁrst period
of a block.
As in HO2006, we ﬁx a payoﬀ vector v to be achieved in equilibrium and pick four action




X;Y) i = 1;2; X;Y 2 fG;Bg;
where w
G;G
i > vi > w
B;B
i for i = 1;2, and
w
G;B




2 > v2 > w
G;B
2 :
As in HO2006, these action proﬁles can be assumed to be pure, either with the use of a
public randomization device or by picking a quadruple of sequences of action proﬁles such
that the average payoﬀ of each of the sequences satisfy the above properties.
We let ~ ST
i be the set of block strategies for player i, i.e. the set of strategies for the
T-period perfect monitoring repeated game. We let ~ Si be the set of strategies ~ si 2 ~ ST
i such















14with a 2 M1  G (t  1). We then let
~ Ai(~ h
t





i  f~ si 2 ~ Si : ~ si[~ h
t
i](ai) >  for all ~ h
t
i and ai 2 ~ Ai(~ h
t
i)g:
We now deﬁne ~ H
R;t
i to be the set of period-t private histories of player i in the T-
times-repeated game with perfect monitoring that are on the equilibrium path for some
(and therefore, every) strategy proﬁle in ~ S

1  ~ S

2. Then we identify each ~ ht
i 2 ~ Ht
i with the
unique element of ht
i 2 Ht
i such that ht
i and ~ ht
i report exactly the same observations about
the play of player  i at all times and ht
i contains no observations with a positive lag (all
observations are observed instantaneously). We then deﬁne H
R;t
i as the image of ~ H
R;t
i under
this identiﬁcation. We then denote this identiﬁcation by ~ ht
i ' ht
i for ~ ht









i . This means that H
E;t
i
includes any private histories in which a player i did not immediately observe the period-t0
play of player  i for some t0 < t.
Additionally let us deﬁne the set of strategies Si  ST
i in the repeated game with obser-
vation lags as the set
Si  fsi 2 S
T




i] for all ~ h
t
i 2 ~ H
t













i  fsi 2 Si : si[h
t




i and ai 2 Ai(h
t
i)g:
15Despite the fact that the game being studied is not a private monitoring game, it is useful
to deﬁne the analogue of a private monitoring structure, the immediate monitoring structure
 induced by  and :
(!1;!2ja1;a2) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :










2 j a1;a2) !1 6= 1 and !2 = 1
(0)2(!1;!2 j a1;a2) !1;!2 6= 1:
This monitoring structure  omits details about the probability distribution over signals in
the future. However, it is useful for our proof of Theorem 4.3.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows from three key lemmata; once these lemmata have been
established, the remainder of the proof follows exactly as in HO2006. The ﬁrst lemma adapts
Lemma 1 of HO2006 to our setting of repeated games with information lags. Because the
proof requires some nontrivial modiﬁcations, we include the argument here. As we show in
the Appendix, analogous modiﬁcations can be made to the proofs of Lemmata 2 and 3 of
HO2006; Theorem 4.3 then follows.
We write si j Hi for the restriction of strategy si to history set Hi. We let ~ UT
i be the payoﬀ
of player i in the T-times repeated game with perfect monitoring and no observation lags.
Analagously deﬁne UT
i to be the ex-ante payoﬀ player i in the T-times repeated game with
private monitoring structure  and observation lags. We consider a version of the the T-times
repeated game (with observation lags) which is augmented with a transfer  i : HT
i ! R at
the end of the T-th period. In this auxilary scenario, the payoﬀ of i under strategy proﬁle s
16is taken to be
U
A
i (s;i)  U
T
i (s) + (1   )
TE(i j s):
The set of best responses of player i in the auxilary scenario with opponent’s strategy s i
and own transfer i is denoted Bi(s i;i).
With these notations, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. For every strategy proﬁle  s j HE, there exists  " > 0 such that whenever
(0) > 1  " and  is  "-perfect, then there exists a nonnegative transfer 
B
i : HT













 i and  sB
 i j HE
 i =  s i j HE
















i (~ si;  s
B
 i):
This generalizes lemma 1 of HO2006 to a repeated game in which information does not
arrive instantaneously. To do so, we must contend with the fact that HT
 i contains many
more histories than in their private monitoring environment because information may arrive
with lag, so that it is not immediately clear how to construct the 
B
i : We handle this issue
by partitioning the set of histories into appropriate sets and identifying each of the elements
of the partition with a particular history in the private monitoring repeated game.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We wish to specify transfers 
B
i : HT
 i ! R  in such a way that players
are indiﬀerent between all possible strategies in the T-period repeated game given auxiliary
transfers 
B



























if and only if h
T 1
 i = ^ h
T 1
 i and aT
i = ^ aT
i . Here, if player i does not obtain information about
the play of player  i in time T, then aT





i are the elements of h
T;o
i that are not equal to aT
i . We may represent
this equivalence class of T period histories in the form (h
T 1
 i ;aT
i ); note that this indicates
that neither
1. the action played by player  i in period T, nor
2. new information gained about past actions
matter for the determination of the equivalence class.
We deﬁne equivalence classes over t-period histories similarly, and represent such an
equivalence class by (h
t 1
 i ;at
i). We now deﬁne a transfer function 
B
i as in HO2006 for some



















 i is the t-period truncation of hT
 i and at
i is the signal that player  i observed of
player i’s period-t action in period t. That is, at
i = 1 if player  i does not observe i’s play
immediately and is otherwise equal to the actual period-t action of player i.14
14According to this deﬁnition, if for example the play of player 1’s period-1 action is not observed imme-
diately (i.e. in period 1) by player 2, then the observation of player 1’s period-1 action in a later period only
has an eﬀect on 
B
i through its eﬀect on player  i’s play.
18Given any h
T 1









Note that the matrix above has full row rank when (0) is suﬃciently close to one and  is
suﬃciently close to perfect monitoring. Therefore the sub-matrix obtained by deleting the
column corresponding to the “1” signal is invertible.15 We then set t(h
T 1
 i ;1) = 0 and





 i ))  T(h
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i is the stage game best response to  sB
 i(h
T 1
 i ). Our preceding observations show
that system (1) has a unique solution when (0) is suﬃciently large and  is suﬃciently close
to perfect monitoring.
Then in period T   1, player i is indiﬀerent between all of his actions given that player
 i plays according to the strategy prescribed by  sB
 i at history h
T 1
 i and transfers given by
T(h
T 1






















We proceed in a similar manner using arguments about  i to deﬁne t for t < T; details
of this construction are presented in the Appendix.
15In fact, this sub-matrix approaches the identity matrix as (0) ! 1 and  approaches perfect monitoring.
194.3 The Repeated Game with Possibly Long Observation Lags
In the previous section, we required that the probability of a positive lag be small. In
this section, we show that even if the lags may be very long, the folk theorem still obtains
when (1) is suﬃciently small. Intuitively, this is possible because players may be taken
to be arbitrarily patient; the length of the lag therefore should not aﬀect the deterrence of
deviations as long as the probability that a signal never arrives is not too large.
We ﬁrst state the following lemma that employs a technique similar to that used in the
proof of Theorem 3.2, using delayed-response strategies to relate the equilibrium payoﬀs in
the game with rare observation lags to those with possibly long lags.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose v 2 E(;; ^ ) for all lag distributions ^  such that ^ (0) > 1  " and all
 2 (;1). Then there exists some 
 2 (0;1) and " 2 (0;1) such that for all lag distributions
 such that (1) < ", v 2 E(;;) for all  > 
.
Proof. First, we set " =  "=2. We consider any  such that (1) < ". There exists K 2 N
be such that (1   (K   1)) < 2" =  ". We choose 
 = 
1
K. Then for every  > 
, there
exists a positive integer, N()  K, such that 
N() 2 (;1).
Now we divide the repeated game G(;;) into N() distinct repeated game “threads,”
the `-th (1  `  N()) of which is played in periods
`; N() + `; 2N() + `;:::;
noting that as N()  K + 1, each of these separate repeated games can be regarded
as equivalent to G(
N();; ^ ) for some ^  such that ^ (0) > 1   2". Now, each repeated
game thread can be treated independently, as players never condition their play in the `-th
20thread on information received about play in the `0-th repeated games (`0 6= `). Because
v 2 E(
N();; ^ ), it is then clear that v 2 E(;;) for all  > 
.
Theorem 4.2 follows directly from Lemma 4.5 and Theorem 4.3.
Remark. Note that our approach requires the availability of timestamps, as otherwise players
cannot play the equilibria constructed above in which players delay responding to information
received early. We believe that it is diﬃcult to imagine a repeated interaction model where
timestamps are not observed (unless the payoﬀ structure is deﬁned in an obscure manner).
5 Public Monitoring with Arbitrary Observation Lags
and Communication
5.1 Model
In this section, we again consider an n-player repeated stage game with a ﬁnite action space
Ai for each player. Now, however, we assume that the monitoring structure of the repeated
game is public with stochastic lags: There is a set of public signals, denoted Y , and we set

i = Y and ci = 1 for all players i 2 I. Furthermore we assume that  is supported on the
set
f(y1;:::;yn) 2 Y
n : y1 = y2 =  = yng:
That is, the monitoring structure of the underlying repeated game without lags is public.
With a slight abuse of notation, we then write (yja) as shorthand for ((y;:::;y)ja).
We place a mild restriction on the support of the monitoring structure .
21Assumption 5.1. For every mixed action proﬁle , there exist y;y0 2 Y with y 6= y0 such
that (yj);(y0j) > 0.
Assumption 5.1 is not strictly necessary for the folk theorem result. We explain how to
modify the construction after we specify the strategies used in the proof.
Before presenting our results for this model, we note that the argument used for the case
of lagged perfect monitoring does not work here because the analogous auxiliary game does
not have almost-perfect monitoring. Moreover, an extension of the Hörner and Olszewski
(2009) construction to repeated games with rare observation lags is not possible, because
that construction assumes that each player assigns high probability to the event that all
players observe the same signal as in Mailath and Morris (2002); this condition is violated
when a player observes the low-probability “null” signal. The possibility of receiving an
uninformative signal also prohibits the application of the folk theorem of Sugaya (2011) for
general private monitoring games, because the necessary full rank condition fails. Thus,
instead of invoking or adapting existing results for general private monitoring games, we
allow for the possibility of communication that is perfectly and publicly observed at the end
of every period, i.e. Mi 6= ;. We show that as long as jMij  jY j+1 for all i, a folk theorem
can be established.
5.2 The Folk Theorem
We begin our analysis with the simple observation that the repeated play of a is an equi-
librium of the game with observation lags.16 We use this fact along with techniques from
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) (hereafter
16Note that for such play, the communication strategies are irrelevant, so we need not specify them.
22referred to as FLM) to construct equilibria that generate any payoﬀ proﬁle v 2 int(Va).
To use the techniques of FLM, we need to impose some additional assumptions on the
public monitoring structure . Recall the following deﬁnition from FLM.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let  be a public monitoring structure. Then a mixed action proﬁle  has









has rank jAij + jAjj   1.
We will maintain the following restriction on  throughout the rest of this section.
Assumption 5.3. For all pairs i;j, there exists a proﬁle  that has pairwise full rank for
that pair.
We can now state our folk theorem for repeated games with public monitoring and
stochastic lags with communication.
Theorem 5.4. Let v 2 int(Va) and suppose that  satisﬁes Assumptions 5.1 and 5.3.
Furthermore suppose that jMij  jY j+1 for all i. Then there exist some 
;" 2 (0;1) such
that v 2 E(;) for all  > 
 and all lag distributions  such that (1) < ".
The remainder of the section proves this result.
235.3 Step 1: Private Monitoring Game with Communication
5.3.1 Step 1a: Incentives for Truthful Communication
We ﬁrst consider a private monitoring game with communication (in every period) and no
observation lags for which each player’s message space is Mi = ~ Y  Y [ f1g. Let us ﬁrst
deﬁne some notation. For a vector ~ y 2 ~ Y n, deﬁne j~ yj  jfi : ~ yi 6= 1gj. Deﬁne the following
set
Y  f(~ y1;:::; ~ yn) 2 ~ Y
n : j(~ y1;:::; ~ yn)j > 0 and ~ yj = ~ yk8j;k such that ~ yj; ~ yk 6= 1g:
The monitoring structure is then supported on the set Y [ f(1;:::;1)g. For any ~ y 2 Y,
we deﬁne ~ ~ y 2 Y to be the y 2 Y such that ~ yj = y for all j such that ~ yj 6= 1.




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(1   ")j~ yj"n j~ yj
 ~ ~ yja

~ y 2 Y n (1;:::;1)
"n ~ y = (1;:::;1)
0 otherwise:
We denote by Gpr(;") the private monitoring game with parameters  and " (and com-
munication) and let Epr(;") be the set of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of Gpr(;"). We
now show
Theorem 5.5. Let v 2 int(Va). Then there exist ; 2 (0;1) with  <  and  " 2 (0;1) such
that v 2 Epr(;") for all  2 [;] and all " <  ".
To prove this theorem we construct strategies that generate a payoﬀ proﬁle of v, and
24are public perfect in the sense that strategies in the non-communication stages of the game
depend only on the sequence of message proﬁles reported in the history. These strategies
use a form of grim-trigger reversion to static Nash equilibrium when the messages disagree,
in order to provide incentives for truthful reporting. We prove the theorem in two parts. We
ﬁrst prove a lemma demonstrating that truth-telling is incentive compatible (i.e. that each
player i should report message mi = y upon seeing signal y 2 Y ) when " is suﬃciently small
given strategies with this grim-trigger property.
Lemma 5.6. Let W be a convex, compact set that is a subset of int(Va). Consider a
collection of public perfect strategy proﬁles f;"g indexed by  and " for all  2 [;] and
" < " with the following properties.
1. In period t, each player i (truthfully) communicates the signals ~ yt
i 2 ~ Y = Mi he observes
in period t.
2. If in the history, there exists some t such that mt = 2 Y, then all players i play a
i.
3. Expected continuation values are always contained in W for play of ;" in the game
Gpr(;") whenever the message history contains only elements in the set Y.
Then there exists some "   " such that for all " < " and all  2 [;], truthful
communication is incentive compatible at any private history in Gpr(;") given continuation
play determined by ;" and truthful communication by all other players.
Proof. For suﬃciently small ", we check that there are no proﬁtable one-stage deviations in
which a player misreports once and then follows the continuation strategy prescribed by 
;"
i .
First note that if the player is at a history in which there exists some t at which mt = 2 Y,
25then all players play a
i forever from that point on. Since then continuation play does not
depend on the message being sent, all players are indiﬀerent to the message that they send
after such a history. Thus it is incentive compatible.
So it remains to analyze incentives for truth-telling after histories in which mt 2 Y for
all t. Suppose ﬁrst that player i sees the null signal. Then by reporting 1, player i obtains






for some  2
Qn
i=1 (Ai) and some expected continuation value function w : Y ! W.17







Thus, to show that truth-telling is incentive compatible after all histories in which a player











for all y0 2 Y , all  2
Qn
i=1 (Ai), all w : Y ! W, i = 1;:::;n, and all " < ". Note that
for a ﬁxed map, w : Y ! W and  2
Qn
i=1 (Ai), we have (2) for all i = 1;:::;n and all
17Note that in any sequential equilibrium if a player i observes signal 1, then he still believes with
probability 1 that all players  i played according to their prescribed actions, i.e. that there have been no
“unexpected” events. Thus the  in the above expression is indeed the prescribed mixed action in the current
period that generated the null signal. However this is immaterial to our proof since we allow  to be any
mixed action.












The inequality (3) clearly holds for suﬃciently small ", by 5.1 and the fact that W is a convex
set bounded away from 0. Moreover
Qn
i=1 (Ai) and the set of all maps w : Y ! W are
both compact. Therefore there exists such an " that is uniform across all  and all maps
w : Y ! W. Thus all players will report the null signal upon observation of a null signal
when " < ".
Now suppose that player i observes y 2 Y . By reporting truthfully, player i obtains a
payoﬀ of wi(y) for some map w : Y ! W. However by reporting y0 2 Y with y0 6= y, player i
obtains a payoﬀ of "n 1wi(y0) while reporting 1 yields a payoﬀ of (1   "n 1)wi(y) . Clearly






for all y 2 Y , all maps w : Y ! W, all i = 1;:::;n, and all " < ". Then all players
have an incentive to report truthfully upon observing an informative signal when " < "
since wi(y) > maxy06=yf"n 1wi(y0)g and wi(y) > (1 "n 1)wi(y) trivially. This concludes the
proof.
Remark. Note that " does not depend on . The reason for this is that the set W does
not depend on the discount factor . 18 This is important for our folk theorem as we must
18If instead W is allowed to depend on , then an " that is independent of  cannot necessarily be
constructed.
27establish a claim about all games with " < " and all discount factors in an interval.
Remark. Assumption 5.1 is only used in the proof of this lemma and is not strictly required
there. Instead, if the strategy construction at some histories calls for the play of an 
that only generates one public signal y, we can specify that players report y even after
seeing 1. We would then introduce a public randomization device so that after the message
report continuation play could still generate payoﬀ vector w(y) with probability 1 "n (and
otherwise trigger reversion to the static Nash a), rather than probability 1.
5.3.2 Step 1b: Non-Communication Stages
Lemma 5.6 establishes incentives for truth-telling when ;" satisﬁes certain characteristics
and " is suﬃciently small. We now show that given truthful communication by all players
at all histories, we can construct a collection of strategies f;"g that satisfy the necessary
properties of Lemma 5.6 for truthful communication and in which all players are also playing
best-responses in the non-communication stages of the game.
To construct such strategies ;", we ﬁrst specify that players play a whenever in the
history there exists some t such that mt = 2 Y. Then it is trivial that playing a
i is a best
response at such a history since opponents play a
 i forever. It remains to specify play after
histories in which all messages in the history are elements of Y. We do this by considering
public strategies that only depend on the history of messages.
Given strategies that satisfy conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma 5.6, we can simplify the analysis
to that of an auxiliary public monitoring game deﬁned in the following discussion. The
auxiliary game is one of standard simultaneous moves in which public signals arise according
to the conditional probability distribution (yja) every period. We then modify this repeated
28game so that at the beginning of periods 1;2;:::, the game ends with probability "n and
each player receives ﬂow payoﬀs of 0 = gi(a) thereafter. This corresponds exactly to the
event in which all players report the null signal, triggering all players to play according to
a forever.19









We denote by Gpu(;") the public monitoring game with parameters  and " and let
Epu(;") be the set of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of Gpu(;"). Note that in this game the
feasible payoﬀ set is not constant in  and ", and in particular for any ﬁxed ", as  ! 1, the
feasible payoﬀ set converges to f0g, just as the payoﬀs to grim trigger strategies converge
to those of static Nash equilibrium as  ! 1 in a repeated game with imperfect public
monitoring. However for any ﬁxed , as " ! 0, the feasible payoﬀ set converges to V;
the feasible payoﬀ set of the original public monitoring game. Our analysis takes care in
addressing this issue.
In order to extend the arguments of FLM to this modiﬁed repeated game, we ﬁrst renor-
malize payoﬀs so that the feasible payoﬀ set is indeed equal to V . We do this by multiplying
the payoﬀs by a factor of (1   (1   "n))=(1   ) to get payoﬀ structure









19Because all players report truthfully at all histories, message proﬁles m 2 ~ Y n n fY [ (1;:::;1)g never
occur on the equilibrium path. Thus the “grim phase” of playing a forever is only triggered in the event of
message proﬁle m = (1;:::;1); this happens with probability "n.
29Now, our modiﬁed game corresponds to a repeated game with discount factor given by (1 
"n), hence all of the conclusions of FLM can be applied to this game, with the appropriate
assumptions on the (original) public monitoring structure.
Before we proceed with the analysis of the game, recall the deﬁnition of self-generation
(Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)).
Deﬁnition 5.7. For W  Rn; deﬁne B(W;;") to be the set of v 2 Rn such that there
exists some mixed action proﬁle  and a map w : Y ! W such that










for all ai 2 Ai and all i. Analogously deﬁne ^ B(W;;") to be the set of v 2 Rn such that
there exists some mixed action proﬁle  and a map w : Y ! W such that
v = (1   (1   "





vi  (1   (1   "





for all i. We say that W is self-generating in the repeated game with payoﬀ structure (4)
with discount factor  and absorption probability " if W  B(W;;"). Similarly, W is
self-generating in the repeated game with payoﬀ structure (5) with discount factor  and
absorption probability " if W  ^ B(W;;").
Because the public monitoring game Gpr(;") has a slightly diﬀerent structure from that
30of a standard public monitoring game, the consequences of self-generation are not immediate
from past theorems, but the same ideas apply as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.8. Suppose W is compact and that W  B(W;;"). Then W  Epu(;").
The proof of Lemma 5.8 is completely standard; we present it in the web appendix.
We now use Lemma 5.8 to prove a folk theorem for our public monitoring game Gpr(;"):
First, we note that we can apply FLM to the repeated game with discount factor (1   "n),
to show the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. Suppose that Assumption 5.3 holds. Let ^ W be a smooth, compact, convex set in
the int(Va). Then there exists   2 (0;1) and  " 2 (0;1) such that for all  >   and all " <  ",
^ W  ^ B( ^ W;;"), that is, ^ W is self-generating in the repeated game with payoﬀ structure (5)
with discount factor  and absorption probability ".
Next, we translate the payoﬀ set used in Lemma 5.9 back into payoﬀs without the renor-




1   (1   "n)
^ W: (6)
Of course for any ﬁxed " and a ﬁxed set ^ W, as  ! 1, W shrinks (setwise) towards the
point-set f0g. Thus for any choice of v 2 int(Va), v will necessarily lie outside of W for 
close to 1. Thus it is not immediate from Lemma 5.9 that, for any discount factor , one can
construct a self-generating set containing v according to the B operator rather than the ^ B
operator. The next lemma shows that this can be done for a non-empty interval of discount
factors.
31Lemma 5.10. Let v 2 int(Va) and suppose that Assumption 5.3 holds. Consider the re-
peated game with payoﬀs given by (4). Then there exist ; 2 (0;1) with  <  and  " 2 (0;1)
such that v 2 Epu(;") for all " < " and all  2 [;]. Furthermore there exists some compact
set W  int(Va) such that the equilibrium corresponding to payoﬀ v can be taken to have
continuation values that always lie in W for all  2 [;] and all " < ".
Proof. Fix some v 2 int(Va). Then choose a compact, smooth, convex set ^ W  int(Va)
such that v 2 ^ W. Since ^ W is bounded away from 0 and contains v, there exists some  < 1
and compact set W such that v 2 0 ^ W  W  int(Va) for all 0 2 [;1]. By Lemma 5.9,
there exists some  and " such that ^ W  ^ B( ^ W;;") for all    and all " < ".
Now choose  2 (;1) arbitrarily. Then choose
" = min
(








This then implies that for all " < " and all  2 [;],
v 2 W;" 
1   
1   (1   "n)
^ W  W  int(Va):
Furthermore ^ W  ^ B( ^ W;;") for all " < " and all  2 [;].
This observation allows us to establish all of our claims. To see this, we note that for
every  2 [;] and all " <  ", every  w 2 ^ W can be written in the form
 wi = (1   (1   "





for all i for some  and some ^ w : Y ! ^ W so that i is a best response given the expected
32continuation payoﬀ ^ wi and opponents’ current mixed action proﬁle  i. Translating payoﬀs
into the original normalization under (4), we get
1   
1   (1   "n)





1   (1   "n)
^ wi(y)(yj):
We then note that
1   
1   (1   "n)
^ wi(y) 2 W;"
for all y 2 Y and all i. Thus we have v 2 W;"  B(W;";;") and W;"  W for all  2 [;]
and all " <  ". Then from Lemma 5.8, we can then show that if v 2 W  B(W;";;") then
v 2 Epu(;"). Therefore v 2 Epu(;") for all " < " and all  2 [;].
Then lemmas 5.6 and Lemma 5.10 together prove Theorem 5.5. To close the section,
we link the private monitoring game with communication, Gpr(;"), to the original repeated
game with public monitoring and observation lags: For a given lag distribution  and some
T 2 N, we deﬁne ~ G(;;T) = Gpr(;1   (T)), and let ~ E(;;T) be the set of sequential
equilibrium payoﬀs of ~ G(;;T) for which equilibrium play depends only on the message
histories.
5.4 Step 2: The Repeated Game with Observation Lags
We can now use the results established in the ﬁrst two subsections to prove Theorem 5.4. We
show that in the repeated game with observation lags, it is suﬃcient to consider equilibria
of the game with communication in which the message spaces in each period are Mi = ~ Y .
Thus henceforth G(;) and E(;) speciﬁcally refer to the repeated game with observation
33lag distribution , discount factor , and message spaces Mi = ~ Y .
Lemma 5.11. Suppose that v 2 ~ E(;;T) for all  2 [;] for some ﬁxed  and all T  T ,
where 0 <  <  < 1. Then there exists some 
 2 (0;1) such that v 2 E(;) for all  > 
.





T+1, so that for every  > 
, there exists a positive integer multiple
of T  + 1, N(), such that 
N() 2 [;].
Now we divide the repeated game G(;L) into N() distinct repeated game threads, the
`-th (1  `  N()) of which is played in periods
`; N() + `; 2N() + `;::::
We have players communicate the public signal generated at the end of period (k 1)N()+m
at the end of period kN() + (m   1), so that each repeated game thread is equivalent to a
private monitoring game of the form described in the previous section.
As in the proof of Lemma 4.5, each repeated game can be treated independently, as
players never condition their play in the `-th repeated game on information received about
play in the `0-th repeated games (`0 6= `). Moreover, any equilibrium of ~ G(
N();L;N())
where play depends only on the message history can be embedded into an equilibrium of one
of the repeated game threads. But since N() > T  + 1, we have v 2 ~ E(
N();L;N()), so
it is then clear that v 2 E(;L) for all  > 
.
Remark. Note that the proof of this lemma uses delayed-response strategies in two ways:
delayed-response both ensures that in each thread there is very low probability of a lag longer
than the thread length, and maps discount factors near 1 in the game G(;) to intermediate
discount factors in the auxiliary games. We need this latter feature here because the grim
34strategies used to punish misreporting are excessively strong when  is near 1. This second
use of threading is closely analogous to the use of threads in the work of Ellison (1994).
We can now ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. By Theorem 5.5, there exist ; 2 (0;1) with  <  and " 2 (0;1)
such that v 2 Epr(;") for all  2 [;] and all " < ".
Now, suppose that (1) < ". Then, there exists a (ﬁnite) K such that 1 (K) < ".
Then, we have that v 2 ~ E(;;T) for all  2 [;] and all T  K. This however means—by
Lemma 5.11—that there exists some 
 2 (0;1) such that v 2 E(;) for all  > 
; this
concludes the proof.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
As we argued in the introduction, the key role of the repeated games model makes it impor-
tant to understand which of its many simpliﬁcations are essential for the folk theorem. We
have extended this result to two settings in which players’ information about others’ play
arrives with stochastic lags. In both of the settings we consider, there is a special but natu-
ral form of private information, as players do not know whether and when their opponents
observe signals.
Our proof in the case of almost-perfect monitoring (and no communication) crucially
depends on the methods of HO2006. Unfortunately, our proof technique does not extend to
repeated games with n players. We could attempt to classify any history containing the null
signal as an erroneous history and follow the approach of HO2006 for n-player games, but this
approach is invalid because of the HO2006 n-player proof’s requirement of communication
35phases.
For repeated games with observation lags having ﬁnite support (possibly including 1), it
may seem that the discussion in Remark 4 of HO2006 regarding almost-perfect monitoring
private monitoring games with general signal spaces could be useful. This is due to the
fact that as long as the lag distribution has ﬁnite support, we can take the K chosen in
Lemma 4.5 to be suﬃciently large so that each thread corresponds to a private monitoring
game.20 However the conjecture in Remark 4 of HO2006 regarding the partition of signals
contains an error and thus cannot be applied.21 Instead we conjecture that the set of all
belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs in n-player games without communication can be attained in
the game with lags. Using results from Yamamoto (2009), one could then obtain a lower
bound on the limit equilibrium payoﬀ set for n-player repeated games with almost-perfect
monitoring structures and observation lags.
A more substantial extension of our results would be be to the case in which the lag
distribution varies with the discount factor. It seems likely that our results would extend to
settings in which longer lags become somewhat more likely as players become more patient,
but we do not know how rapid an increase can be accommodated.
A Details Omitted from the Proof of Theorem 4.3
A.1 Details Omitted from the Proof of Lemma 4.4
Suppose that all transfers  for   t have been deﬁned so that player i is indiﬀerent across
all of his strategies from period t + 1 on. Then deﬁne Ut+1(h
t 1
 i ;ai) to be the expected
20Note that this is not the case if the lag distribution’s support is not ﬁnite.
21We thank Yuichi Yamamoto for pointing out this error.
36continuation payoﬀ given the transfers at period t + 1, given that player  i’s history in
period t   1 is h
t 1
 i and player i played ai in period t.


























Let us denote the sub-matrix obtained by deleting the column corresponding to the null
signal “1” by D(h
t 1
 i ). This is again invertible when (0) is suﬃciently close to one and 







 i ))  t(h
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+ (1   )Ut+1(h
t 1
 i ;ai)



















 i ) is the term that maximizes the expression on the right hand side of the
equation above.
Because the matrix D(h
t 1
 i ) is invertible, the system (7) has a unique solution when we
set t(h
t 1
 i ;1) = 0. Iterating in this manner allows us to obtain the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
To achieve non-negativity of transfers, we observe that as the square matrices D(h
t 1
 i )
converge to the identity matrix, the solutions t(h
t 1
 i ;ai) must be non-negative in the limit.
Thus we can make all transfers t(h
t 1
 i ;ai) non-negative by adding to all of them a positive
37constant that converges to zero as (0) and  jointly converge to 1 and perfect monitoring
respectively.
Finally we deﬁne a strategy rB
i 2 ST
i in the following way. Let rB
i (h
t 1




 i ) as deﬁned above for all histories h
T 1
 i that do not contain any null signals, where
h
t 1
i is the history that corresponds to h
t 1
 i . Deﬁne rB
i (h
t 1
i ) arbitrarily for all other histories.
Then note that as monitoring becomes perfect, the expected value of 
B
i goes to zero if players
play according to rB
i and  sB
 i. By the deﬁnition of rB
i , the payoﬀ in the T-times-repeated
game without any transfers then approaches maxsi2ST
i UT
i (si;  sB












i (~ si;  s
B
 i)
for all si 2 ST
i .
A.2 An Additional Lemma
We follow the notation and terminology of HO2006. The next lemma deﬁnes the transfers

G
i for the repeated game with rare lags; this provides analogs of the results of Lemmata 2
and 3 of HO2006.
Lemma A.1. For every strategy proﬁle  s j HE, there exists  " > 0 such that, whenever
Pr(L > 0) <  " and  is  "-perfect, there exists a nonpositive transfer 
G
i : HT




i : si j H
R
i = ^ si j H
R
i for some ^ si 2 Si and si j H
E
i =  si j H
E









 i and  sG
 i j HE




 i ! R  can be




















~ si2 ~ Si
~ U
T





i depends continuously on  s, and 
G
i is bounded away from  1.
Proof. Let " > 0 be such that  is "-perfect and Pr(L > 0) < ". For every  > 0, observe







i , player i assigns probability at least 1    to the event that player  i
observe the corresponding history h
t 1




i and any action
ai 2 Ai, the row vector consisting of the probabilities assigned by player i, conditional on
history h
t 1
i and on action ai taken by player i in period t, to the diﬀerent equivalence classes
of histories (h
t 1
 i ;ai) observed by player  i in period t. As in HO2006, we construct a matrix




i and actions ai 2 Ai.
Note that for small enough "=, the matrix Dt 1 has full row rank for every t.
With this we can deﬁne (;) by setting (h
t 1





is possible since the number of rows is exactly the same as in HO2006 and the number of
columns corresponding to (h
t 1
 i ;ai) for some ai 6= 1 is also the same as in HO2006. This
proves the lemma.
39A.3 Concluding the Argument
The remainder of the proof of Theorem 4.3 follows along the same lines as in HO2006, deﬁning
 sB
 i j HE






i as the ﬁxed point of the relevant correspondence.22 The
construction works because of Lemma A.1 and the fact that play at periods T;2T;:::, is
belief free (by Lemma 4.4). Thus for example if player i receives information about the
play of player  i in period T   m at some time T + l, this does not have any eﬀect on his
best response calculation since player i’s strategy only depends on the history of information
about the events occurring after period T.
B Web Appendix
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.8
Suppose that W  B(W;;"). Then take any v 2 W. We construct a strategy in the game
Gpu(;") that achieves the payoﬀ proﬁle v.
Note that due to the self-generation of W, there exists functions  : W !
Qn
i=1 (Ai)
and   : W  Y ! W such that for every v 2 W,











22See HO2006 for details.
40for all ai 2 Ai and all i = 1;:::;n.
We now deﬁne recursively sequences of maps vt : Y t ! W and t : Y t !
Qn
i=1 (Ai) for
all t = 0;1;2;:::. Begin by setting v0 = v and 0 = (v). Suppose that vt : Y t ! W and

















Then consider the strategy proﬁle  that is the collection ftg1
t=0. To see that this strategy































right hand side of the equation above converges to v since vT+1 is a function that maps into













Moreover by the same argument, the continuation payoﬀ at any public history (y0;:::;yt)
induced by  is also equal to vt+1(y0;:::;yt). Then the optimality of i against  i follows
immediately by construction due to the one-stage deviation principle.
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